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Democracy and Constitutionalism

The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the
Critique of Ideology. By Susan Marks. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000. Pp. 164. Price: $49.99 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Evan
Criddle.
In the wake of revolutionary changes in the political landscape of
Southern Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe over the last three
decades, some legal scholars have argued that international law has outgrown
its traditional ideological neutrality. No longer should international law simply
preserve peace through impartial Cold-War-style balancing. Instead, these
scholars argue that international law must lay the foundation for a more secure
and lasting peace by recognizing and fostering the emergence of a universal
"right to democratic governance." In The Riddle of Constitutions:
International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology, Susan Marks
uses a critique of ideology to deconstruct popular formulations of this
"'democratic norm' thesis" (p. 2). Marks's critique offers a penetrating
analysis of the ways in which acceptance of a "democratic norm" actually
stabilizes and perpetuates relations of domination, rather than promoting selfrule and political equality, as its proponents maintain.
According to Marks, acceptance of the "democratic norm" in
international law would have tremendous consequences for national
governments. For example, a democratic norm in international law would
suggest that national governments derive legitimacy from internationally
specified criteria. Only governments founded upon democratic principles
would meet the standard set by these criteria. Marks admits, of course, that
this position is vulnerable to attack on a number of fronts. First of all, the
assessment that a democratic norm of governance is emerging is far from
clear, especially outside of the Western world. Hence, forcing pro-democratic
bias upon international law may represent a threat of neoimperialism. Second,
even if a principle of "democracy" merits transnational application, narrow
application of the "democratic norm thesis" might promote structural change
in ways that would limit rather than expand democratic participation in
decision-making processes.
Marks focuses her critique on the question of how this limitation on
participation would come about. According to Marks, movements toward
democracy often focus on "low-intensity democracy": reforming a limited set
of structures and procedures while leaving deeper power centers
fundamentally intact. Thus, restructuring of certain national political
institutions will not deliver meaningful democratic reform as long as
necessarily related objectives such as human rights, social justice, and civilian
control of the military remain untouched. The institution of free and fair
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elections will have little impact on common citizens while social and
economic inequalities consolidate political power in the hands of only a few.
Nominally democratic political structures will inevitably fail without the
tempering influence of a vibrant public sphere where public policy may be
molded, evaluated, and challenged.
Extending her analysis, Marks argues that the impact of "low-intensity
democracy" upon a single nation can only be understood within a
transnational context. As democracy spreads, it expands the boundaries of
global markets and provides participants in these markets with greater access
to resources as barriers to transnational capital flows dissolve. While newly
liberalized economies may benefit from an influx of foreign investment and
expanded markets for their own goods, they also fall under the economic and
political hegemony of dominant Western states. In this way, fostering "lowintensity democracy" may entrench an uneven distribution of global power
and resources. In addition, new access to transnational markets inevitably
exacerbates uneven power-distributions within the new democracies
themselves. With this socio-economic polarization comes increased social
tension, which in tum provokes the political marginalization of subordinate
classes. Thus, "low intensity democracy" inevitably self-destructs as the
economic and social inequalities it fosters obliterate prospects for meaningful
self-rule and political equality.
Marks further deconstructs "low-intensity" approaches to the
"democratic norm thesis" by analyzing its uses as ideology. For the purposes
of her critique, Marks defines ideology as "ways in which meaning serves to
establish and sustain relations of domination" (p. 10). Like other ideologies,
"low-intensity democracy" employs a number of legitimization and
dissimulation strategies to establish its authority. For instance, supporters of
"low-intensity democracy" resort to rationalization, suggesting that since
"low-intensity" democratization is the only measurable, attainable goal, it
must likewise be the best. At the same time, the "democratic norm" masks
inequalities of decision-making power through devices such as unification, the
"imaginary resolution of social and political antagonisms" (p. 65), and
simplification, "presenting social life in reductive terms . . . [to hide] the
unevenness and complexity of social processes" (p. 65). Similarly, reification
of the term "democracy" and reliance on dichotomous reasoning (democratic
vs. non-democratic) reduce the democratic ideal to a set of finite structural
characteristics, while masking real political inequality among independent
citizens. Such dissimulation strategies draw attention away from the
fundamentally undemocratic realities at play in self-proclaimed democratic
systems. Marks believes that this ideological conceptualization of democracy
encourages policy-makers to approach democratization as a linear process in
which the attainment of civil and political rights necessarily precedes and
frustrates efforts to secure economic and social rights. Furthermore, this
ideological screen masks the extent to which globalization reduces the power
of national decision-makers over their citizenry by fostering dependence upon
extra-national forces.

274

YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 26: 265

How might the "democratic norm" thesis be reformulated to overcome
these ideological roadblocks and achieve more meaningful results? Marks
believes that an important starting-place is the recognition that democracy is
not merely an "institutional arrangement," but rather "an ongoing process of
enhancing the possibilities for self-rule and the prospects for political equality,
against a background of changing historical circumstances" (p. 59). In this
conception, human rights, civil liberties, the rule of law, and free elections are
simply first steps towards democracy, not reliable indicators that democracy
has been achieved. What is needed, Marks asserts, is not the recognition in
international law of a democratic entitlement, but rather a "principle of
democratic inclusion" (p. 109) that would "guide the elaboration, application,
and invocation of international law" (p. 11 1).
Marks concludes her critique by sketching out the possible impact of this
proposed principle of democratic inclusion. Democratic inclusion, she
suggests, would strive to transcend the arbitrary self-limitations of the
democratic norm thesis. In other words, it would encourage policymakers to
address the complex interrelationship between social and economic forces and
political decision-making power. It would take into account the political
implications of contemporary globalization by addressing the effect of
transnational political forces on national political agendas. Attention to the
political and economic hegemony of dominant groups in the international
arena would prompt broader forms of international regulation and
accountability. The principle of democratic inclusion would ground efforts
towards democratization of global politics.
Of course, Marks's deconstruction of the "norm of democratic
governance" begs the question of whether her own reconceptualization of
democracy might not also serve as ideology. Marks concedes that her
"principle of democratic inclusion" is no less susceptible to being used for
ideological purposes. She affirms, however, that the system of ideological
critique employed in her book provides a lens through which to discern and
thereby eliminate any ideology to which her own "principle of democratic
inclusion" might be subjected in the future. Even granting the obvious validity
of this observation, troubling questions persist about Marks's own work. If
both the "democratic norm theory" and the "principle of democratic
inclusion" may be made to serve ideology, why is one principle inherently
superior to another? To what ideological end is Marks's thesis likely to be
applied? Why would her ideology be preferable to ideology associated with
the "democratic norm" thesis?
Even more puzzling than Marks's refusal to engage such questions about
future ideological application of her own proposal, however, is her inability to
confront in a meaningful way the ideology that controls her own basic
assumptions about democracy itself. Why, for example, is democracy
desirable at all? Why is it desirable on an international or transnational scale?
How does the movement for acceptance of democracy on an international
level transcend neoimperialist ideology, particularly Marks's own book?
Marks remains silent on these and many other troubling issues. Fortunately,
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The Riddle of all Constitutions provides skeptics with an excellent critical
paradigm for further interrogation of Marks's own unanswered questions.

